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Abstract. Approaches to animal communication have for the most part been quite 
different in semiotics and evolutionary biology. In this context the writings of a 
leading evolutionary biologist who has also been attracted to semiotics — John 
Maynard Smith — are an interesting exception and object of study. The present 
article focuses on the use and adaptation of semiotic terminology in Maynard 
Smith’s works with reference to general theoretical premises both in semiotics and 
evolutionary biology. In developing a typology of animal signals, Maynard Smith 
employs the concepts of icon, index and symbol to denote distinct signal classes. 
He uses “indices” or “indexes” to express a signal type where the relation between 
signal properties and meaning is restricted because of physical characteristics. 
Such approach also points out the issue of the motivatedness of signs, which has 
had a long history in semiotics. In the final part of the article the usage and 
content of the concepts of signal form and meaning in Maynard Smith’s writings 
are analysed. It appears that in evolutionary biology, the “signal” is a vague 
concept that may denote a variety of things from an animal’s specific physiological 
status to artificial theoretical constructs. It also becomes evident that in actual 
usage the concept of signal often includes references to the receiver’s activity and 
interpretation, which belong rather to the characteristics of sign process. The 
positive influence of Maynard Smith’s works on semiotics could lie in paying 
attention to the role of physical necessities in animal communication. Physical 
constraints and relations also seem to have a significant role in semiotic processes 
although this is not always sufficiently studied or understood in semiotics. 
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An appreciation of semiotics by an evolutionary biologist is a rare 
event that certainly deserves attention. Especially if the biologist under 
consideration is John Maynard Smith (1920–2004), a promoter of 
neo-Darwinian evolutionary biology and an author of well-known 
textbooks in animal communication (Maynard Smith, Szathmáry 
2000; Maynard Smith, Harper 2003). There have been several attempts 
to establish a common ground between semiotics and animal commu-
nication studies, the most significant of those being perhaps the zoo-
semiotic research paradigm by Thomas A. Sebeok (1972, 1990), Peter 
Marler’s semiotically accentuated studies in animal communication 
(for example, Marler 1961, Marler 1978) and Kalevi Kull’s historical 
analyses on semiotic perspectives in biology (Kull 1999, Kull 2004). 
Some later efforts to build a bridge are also worth mentioning, such as 
Winfried Nöth’s lucid overview Semiotics for biologists (Nöth 2005) 
and Thomas P. Weber’s remark in Trends in Ecology and Evolution on 
the benefit of the semiotic approach for raising hypotheses in 
evolutionary biology (Weber 2000). 
In this short survey, I am focusing on the explicit references to 
semiotics and their context in John Maynard Smith’s writings and 
leave the rest of his vast legacy untouched. This means I do not 
include his position in debates on memetics, which is generally 
supportive (Maynard Smith 1995; Maynard Smith, Szathmáry 2000: 
139–140), and his thoughts on the evolution of human language, 
which appear to be allied to biological determinism (Maynard Smith, 
Harper 2003: 133–136; Maynard Smith, Szathmáry 2000: 149–170). 
Concerning the proximity to semiotics, there are several relevant texts 
of interest by Maynard Smith (Maynard Smith, Harper 1995, 2003; 
Maynard Smith 1982, 1999, 2000). Although many of these are co-
authored, contemplations that include references to semiotics have 
also been presented by Maynard Smith solely, which justifies re-
garding these as a part of his original heritage. On the other hand, 
many ideas and inclinations that I critically discuss in this article be-
long to the general legacy of evolutionary biology and their appearan-
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ce in Maynard Smith’s writings should be treated as an individual 
occurrence of much wider development. Maynard Smith’s texts relate 
to semiotics both in regard to terminology used (icon, index, symbol, 
arbitrariness, form, meaning, content, etc.) and references made 
(Charles S. Peirce, Umberto Eco). Maynard Smith’s interest in 
semiotics has also been widely noted (for example, Szathmáry 2006, 
Williams 2007). There exists at least one study close to the topic of the 
present article, namely the analysis of the semantic content of the 
concept “animal signal” in Maynard Smith’s writings with the 
reference to Ruth Millikan’s teleosemantic theory (Stegmann 2005). I 
also touch upon the issue of meaning and the use of concepts of 
animal communication in Maynard Smith’s writings in the second 
part of this article, but my approach and frame of analysis remain 
strictly semiotic (meaning zoo- and biosemiotics here and hereafter). 
 
 
1. Context of John Maynard Smith’s writings  
in animal communication  
 
Despite his use of semiotic terminology and references, the context of 
Maynard Smith’s interest is very different from that of semiotics. 
Namely, his aim in the considered publications is to establish and 
elaborate a typology of animal communication for evolutionary bio-
logy. Maynard Smith’s approach is close to the gene-centric views of 
Richard Dawkins and understandings of communication by Mark D. 
Hauser, John R. Krebs, Oren Hasson and other eminent Neo-Darwi-
nian evolutionary biologists. An essential problem concerning com-
munication in this paradigm is the question of the reliability of the 
communication system. In evolutionary biology organisms are con-
sidered to be essentially egoistic (as maximising their fitness in 
evolution) and because of that they are believed to have generally 
conflicting interests in communication. This understanding was 
expressed by Richard Dawkins and John R. Krebs as conflict between 
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senders as manipulators and receivers as mind-readers (Krebs, 
Dawkins 1984: 380–402) and it is also immanent in their (as well as in 
many other evolutionary biologists’) definition of communication: 
“The process in which actors use specially designed signals or displays 
to modify the behaviour of reactors” (Krebs, Davies 1993: 349).  
Built on this premise, a central question for evolutionary biology is: 
how does a communication system not become corrupt in evolution 
under the conflicting influences of its participants? One hypothesis, 
promoted by Israeli biologists Amotz and Avishag Zahavi under the 
name of the “handicap principle”, argues that signals in honest com-
munication must be costly to produce and maintain by the sender 
(have excess energetic cost) in the way that the same signals cannot be 
afforded by low quality individuals (Zahavi, Zahavi 1997: xv; Maynard 
Smith, Harper 1995: 306). This means that the handicap signals are 
superfluous and hindering, tail of the peacock being a textbook 
example. In Animal Signals: Models and Terminology John Maynard 
Smith and David Harper (1995) present their views on this question in 
the form of a three-dimensional typology of animal communication. 
The first distinction is made between types of information that signals 
convey (self-reporting signals, other-reporting signals and cues); the 
second classification describes the mechanism that is used to ensure 
the reliability of the signal (minimal signals, cost-added signals and 
indexes); and the third dimension describes the relationships between 
the signal form and the object of the signal (the semiotic terminology 
employed for this is discussed in the next chapter). The most 
remarkable aspect in this typology is perhaps the introduction of 
“indices” or “indexes” (the terms are used interchangeably), as a type 
of signals that by definition cannot be faked (Maynard Smith, Harper 
2003: 45–67). Maynard Smith describes “indices” or “indexes” as 
reliable because of their motivatedness, that is, there exists a restrictive 
relation between the signal properties and the quality of the sender 
because of physical necessity (Maynard Smith, Harper 1995: 306). In 
addition to that, there are also other possible ways for a commu-
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nication system to remain functional such as inclusion of coordination 
games, where the sender and receiver prefer different outcomes, but 
share some overriding common interest; repeated interactions, where 
honest signalling contributes to the sender’s reputation in the group; 
and behavioural punishment by species-mates for the sender of a false 
signal (Maynard Smith, Harper 2003: 30).  
Although the question of the existence of a communication system 
under interest conflict can be a fascinating topic for semiotics, the 
validity of the presumption by Richard Dawkins, John R. Krebs and 
others about the manipulatory and deterministic nature of com-
munication needs to be disputed. The well-established criticism 
against such position is presented by theoretical ethologist W. John 
Smith. He disproves the neo-Darwinian understanding of commu-
nication on the following grounds: 1) the emphasis is placed mostly on 
formalised signalling, while other sources of information for the 
receiver are not addressed; 2) formalised displays are not taken as 
probabilistic but rather believed to have one-to-one correspondence 
with the sender’s subsequent behaviour; 3) the conditional nature of 
animal signals is not considered (for example, the receiver’s ability to 
synthesise different types of information, send feedback to the sender, 
make predictions about future scenarios and act accordingly); and 4) 
the social environment where communication takes place is generally 
neglected (that is, long-term consequences of deceptive commu-
nication are not taken into account) (Smith 1986).  
The general difference between the views of Smith and Maynard 
Smith (and many other neo-Darwinians) appears to lie in their under-
standing of the role of the sender and the receiver in communication. 
For Maynard Smith the sender is the one who controls the com-
municative situation whereas the receiver is a passive recipient. For 
Smith, on the contrary, it is the receiver who has autonomy and 
subjectivity of acting and who can relate different types of information 
(this position is also supported by many semioticians, c.f. Kull 2004: 
103). For Smith the outcome of communication is undetermined and 
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probable; for Maynard Smith it is rather determined and rigidly 
structured. The position taken by Maynard Smith appears to be 
inevitable for neo-Darwinian biology for demonstrating that the 
evolutionary success of different genes is the relevant factor for the 
outcome of animal communication. Giving an ability of choice for the 
receiver (as it is more often in animal psychology and especially 
prevalent in cognitive ethology) would make the situation too un-
predictable for a reductionist paradigm.  
This general understanding of communication is also perhaps 
grounds for an otherwise rather peculiar distinction made between 
signal and cue in Maynard Smith’s writings. The signal is described as 
a tool of manipulation, as “an act or structure that alters the behaviour 
of another organism, which evolved because of that effect, and which 
is effective because the receiver’s response has also evolved” (Maynard 
Smith, Harper 2003: 15), and the cue as “a feature of the world, ani-
mate or inanimate that can be used by an animal as a guide to future 
action” (Maynard Smith, Harper 2003: 15). Although the distinction 
itself appears to be fruitful, it is remarkable that the receiving 
organism is supplied with some interpreting skills in the case of cues, 
but the same is not included in the case of signals. From a semiotic 
perspective it is hard to perceive any communicative process as taking 
place without an organism’s interpretive activity. A reason for the 
different use of the concept of cue lays perhaps in its Uexküllian origin. 
From the position of semiotics the differentiation could be regarded as 
a difference in the dynamic balance between the properties of message 
and interpretation, rather than a distinction between types of signs. At 
the same time it needs to be mentioned that on similar grounds, a 
distinction between signal and symptom has been made by Thomas A. 
Sebeok (1994: 22–28). 
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2. Employing icon, index and symbol with  
reference to motivatedness  
 
Another peculiar metamorphosis takes place when the semiotic 
notions of icon, index and symbol are employed in Maynard Smith’s 
typology of animal signals. These concepts turn into distinct types of 
signals, whereas the distinction is based on the relation between form 
and content or between form and meaning. It appears that the semiotic 
terminology is basically employed for arguing the motivatedness of the 
signals. Thus, icon is said to be “a signal whose form is similar to its 
meaning” (Maynard Smith, Harper 2003: 15) and in icons “the form of 
the signal is similar to its content” (Maynard Smith, Harper 1995: 309). 
Indexes or indices are defined as signals whose form “is determined by 
the content” (ibid.) and “whose intensity is causally related to the 
quality being signalled” (Maynard Smith, Harper 2003: 15). Symbol is 
understood as “a signal whose form is unrelated to its meaning” 
(Maynard Smith, Harper 2003: 15).  
Although the use of the concept of “meaning” in this context is a 
rather remarkable influence of semiotics on evolutionary biology, such 
interpretation raises some critical questions. For instance, arguing for 
the similarity between form and content or meaning presupposes their 
belonging to the same logical category and being comparable, which is 
far from being self-evident. Discussing arbitrariness in regard to the 
relations of form and content indicates, however, the influence of 
Saussurean tradition and the whole trichotomy is probably adapted 
through the writings of Eco (for example, 1976: 178). Substituting the 
relationship of sign and its object with that of form and content (or 
meaning) as done by Maynard Smith can be perhaps explained with 
the specifics of biological signalling, where the appearance of an 
animal’s body often signals various inner characteristics of the animal. 
The concepts of content or meaning are also used ambiguously and in 
a way that is not typical to semiotics, as I will show later. 
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The most important alteration in this is, however, that in Peircean 
semiotics icon, index and symbol are types of signs — not signals — 
and are therefore inseparable from the interpretative activity of the 
receiver. According to Peirce, “nothing is a sign unless it is interpreted 
as a sign” (CP 2: 308, my Italics) and sign (or representamen) is 
“anything which determines something else (its interpretant) to refer 
to an object” (CP 2: 303, my Italics). This also means that being an 
icon, index or symbol is rather a quality of a sign and can be related 
with one and the same physical structure depending on the parti-
cipating individual and the specific course of the sign process. For 
instance, the begging display of the female passerine with flapping 
wings, head and neck bended down and beak opened can be both 
indexical and iconic. In the short-term perspective, it can be an 
indexical sign, that is, indicating a physical relation with a meaning 
something like, “put this caterpillar here, in my mouth”. In the long-
term perspective, it can be a sign with iconic dominance, signifying 
the relationship between this specific female and the subsequent 
feeding behaviour of the chicks.  
At the same time it needs to be admitted that the situation is 
actually also more complex in semiotics and Maynard Smith’s 
unintended criticism points to some essential questions of semiotics as 
that of the relationship between the sign and the sign vehicle. It is 
evidently basic intuition in semiotics that signs are relational units that 
cannot be separated from the activity of the interpreter. At the same 
time they are not independent from the properties of the physical 
structures of the world (sign vehicles). This determining relationship 
is present in some of Charles S. Peirce’s many definitions of sign: “I 
define a Sign as anything which is so determined by something else, 
called its Object, and so determines an effect […], which effect I call its 
Interpretant” (SS 80–81), and it is especially expressed in the concept 
of “Dynamical Object, which is the Reality which by some means 
contrives to determine the Sign to its Representation” (CP 4.536). 
Additionally, Peirce’s distinction between icon, index and symbol can 
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be understood as an array of signs from the dependence on the object 
to the dependence on the interpreter’s activity. Icon is a sign that 
“stands for something merely because it resembles it” (EP 1.226), 
index is a sign “determined by its dynamic object by virtue of being in 
a real relation to it” (SS 33) whereas symbol is a sign “which fulfills its 
function regardless of any similarity or analogy with its object and 
equally regardless of any factual connection therewith, but solely and 
simply because it will be interpreted to be a representamen” (CP 5.73). 
Maynard Smith’s perception of icon and index as being more 
motivated than the symbol thus corresponds in general to Peirce’s 
views. This intuition could also perhaps be a relevant dimension for 
the contemporary debate over symbolic signs in animals (Deacon 
1997: 69–101; Queiroz, Ribeiro 2002). For instance many signals used 
in courtship such as the tails of the peacock or lyrebird are considered 
to be symbolic by Maynard Smith exactly on the basis that “form is 
unrelated to actual fighting ability” (Maynard Smith, Harper 2003: 59). 
In a similar vein, many developmental processes can also be con-
sidered symbolic as for instance regulatory codes that have an arbitra-
ry nature (Maynard Smith 1999: 74). Inducer molecules that could 
switch any gene on or off are considered symbolic by Maynard Smith, 
as “there is no necessary connection between their form (chemical 
composition) and meaning (genes switched on or off)” (Maynard 
Smith 2000: 185; for discussion, see Godfrey-Smith 2000).  
For semiotics, the whole topic can be reformulated as a question of 
relations between a sign vehicle and a sign, or between a message 
conveyed in communication and its interpretation by a receiver. In the 
history of semiotics, the position of classical authors regarding the 
relation between a physical sign vehicle and a sign in it as interpreted 
by the receiver is not consistent. If a few classical authors who have 
expressed their opinion on this topic are arranged from the most 
objective stance to the most subjective, the following series could be 
drawn: a) Charles Morris; b) Charles S. Peirce; c) Thomas A. Sebeok; 
and d) Umberto Eco. In Charles Morris’s behaviourist semiotics, a 
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sign or preparatory-stimulus is something that “directs behavior with 
respect to something that is not at the moment a stimulus” (Morris 
1971b: 366, my Italics) or “controls behavior towards a goal in a way 
similar to (but not necessarily identical with) the way something else 
[…] would control behavior with respect to that goal” (Morris 1971b: 
84, my Italics). At the other extreme are the semiological views of 
Umberto Eco, where a sign is “everything that, on the grounds of a 
previously established social convention, can be taken as something 
standing for something else” (Eco 1976: 16, my Italics) and where even 
icons are not considered to be motivated but mostly conventional (Eco 
1976: 191). The positions of Charles S. Peirce and Thomas A. Sebeok 
rest somewhere in between. With each and every one of those authors, 
however, the quality of being a sign is dependent upon the specific 
semiosis, that is, it is not a property of a physical thing. In the words of 
Charles Morris: “something is a sign only because it is interpreted as a 
sign of something by some interpreter” (Morris 1971a: 20). 
 
 
3. Meanings of signals in evolutionary biology 
 
As Maynard Smith employs semiotic terminology to describe the 
relationship between the meaning and form of the signal, it would be 
clarifying to find out what is considered by those two concepts. 
Meaning and form have not been explicitly defined, as is also noted in 
the analysis by Ulrich E. Stegmann (2005: 1016–1017), so assumptions 
need to be made by observing the context of use. Under the concept of 
form Maynard Smith appears to describe the general appearance of 
animal signals, as for instance the ornamentation of male birds 
(Maynard Smith, Harper 2003: 54), fighting displays in many groups 
(ibid., 80), nuptial gifts in crickets (ibid., 85) and others. Thus form 
stands for how animal signals are usually distinguished and described 
in ethology. Concerning the concept of meaning, indirect con-
firmation can be found when addressing the question based on the 
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discussion above — with what signal form is believed to be in an 
iconic, indexical or symbolic relation. It appears that meaning in 
animal communication can be: “fitness” or “some component of” it 
(Maynard Smith, Harper 2003: 14), “quality of interest to the receiver” 
(ibid., 33), “heritable foraging ability or health” (Maynard Smith, 
Harper 2003: 48), “body size and likely fighting ability” (ibid., 50), 
“relative RHP” (resource holding potential; ibid., 50), “running ability” 
(ibid., 52), “heritable parasite resistance” (ibid., 54), “ownership” (ibid., 
57), “foraging ability” (ibid., 60), “aggression” (ibid., 69), “hunger” 
(ibid., 110), “good genes” (Maynard Smith, Harper 1995: 309) and 
“intentions” (Maynard Smith 1982: 4). From this incomplete list it 
becomes apparent that animal signals in evolutionary biology may 
mean a variety of things. These meanings also appear to form different 
categories: some indicating the specific physiological or psychological 
status of animals (that can probably also be perceived by animals); 
others indicating some general ability or future potential of an animal; 
and still others, which are rather theoretical constructs.  
When looking for the pairs of signal form and meaning in May-
nard Smith’s writings, it appears that they are also often accompanied 
by the specific reference to the receiver (mostly female, but also 
contestant or predator). Some examples of such constructions are: the 
“female may choose an index of some component of fitness” (May-
nard Smith, Harper 2003: 14); “we describe how female Drosophila 
subobscura select males according to their ability to ‘dance’ […] — a 
measure of neuromuscular coordination” (Maynard Smith, Harper 
2003: 14); “the female has a rule for estimating the quality of a male 
from his advertisement, p=P(a)” (Maynard Smith, Harper 2003: 20); 
“exposure of the abdomen is a signal of a male’s condition, which may 
be of interest to a female as an indicator of heritable foraging ability or 
health” (Maynard Smith, Harper 2003: 48). These excerpts indicate 
that although meaning/form dyads are explicitly described as signals, 
as it was uncovered before, in actual use the characteristics of the sign 
process are also included (where according to the definition of Peirce, 
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something “stands to somebody for something in some respect or 
capacity”, CP 2:228). 
In works of evolutionary biology such game-theoretic construc-
tions are sometimes accompanied with the remark that these should 
be taken metaphorically (for example, Krebs, Dawkins 1984: 386; the 
issue is addressed by Krebs and Davies 1997: 11). This makes things 
even more obscure for a semiotician, as semiosis is a specific triadic 
relation and there is not much room for metaphors in it. Signals either 
participate in semiosis or not. If they do, then it should be shown how 
the signals (representamen) and their possible consequences (inter-
pretant) are present for the animal. In regard to given quotations this 
would mean demonstrating the relevance of the concepts of “fitness”, 
“neuromuscular coordination”, “rule p=P(a) for estimating the 
quality”, and “heritable foraging ability or health” for the animal. That 
would probably require including some form of intentionality or 
prescience on the cognitive or organismic level of the animal, and on 
the other hand acknowledging the artificial and combinatory nature of 
some concepts such as fitness (as discussed in length in for example 
Mills, Beatty 1979; Ariew, Lewontin 2004). If these signals, however, 
are not meant to participate in semiosis, then this is not a metaphor 
but rather camouflage for covering the anthropomorphism or socio-
morphic modelling (see Komárek 2003:37–44) present in the theory. 
After making this critical comment, the sovereignty and integrity of 
different academic disciplines still need to be admitted; something that 
is not legitimate from the position of semiotics may work decently 
within the framework of mathematical models and theoretical 
constructs of evolutionary biology and vice versa.  
A principal difference between semiotics and evolutionary biology 
is in putting an animate subject into the foreground and considering 
biological processes from its perspective (cf. Kull et al. 2008: 45–47). 
Concerning the present topic, this would mean detailed analyses of an 
animal’s subjective world or Umwelt and distinguishing phenomena 
and processes that can be present for the semiotic self of an animal (in 
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the wide Sebeokian sense, including the immunological, cognitive and 
linguistic self, Sebeok 1991). Evolutionary processes should also be 
considered from that premise, by distinguishing the processes that an 
animal can perceive and influence from those that it cannot. 
Everything in the environment that is present for the animal and 
passes its organs of perception and subsequent action is subject to its 
internal representation and interpretational activity. Such a process 
can be legitimately titled “semiotic selection” (Maran 2005: 171) and 
sexual selection in most of its expressions is one type thereof. A 
principal argument for building an understanding of evolution that 
starts from the individual is the autonomy of the semiotic self as it 
builds and calibrates itself in self-organising and not a predetermined 
way in the specific environmental context and developmental history. 
Thus a semiotic understanding of evolution finds its kinship in 
biology more in evolutionary developmental biology than in Neo-
Darwinian synthesis. 
 
 
4. Searching for common ground between semiotics 
and evolutionary biology  
 
As the conclusion of this article, I would raise a question about the 
possible dialogue between semiotics and evolutionary biology. 
Searching for common ground could turn out to be a rather difficult 
task because of major foundational differences between the two 
paradigms, and this makes the chance of a conflict arising or losing 
one’s own intellectual sovereignty high. Maynard Smith’s approach 
appears to include at least a possibility to relate semiotics and 
evolutionary biology in a way that is not antagonistic or subordinating. 
The positive lesson of his works for semiotics could lie in paying 
attention to the physical structures and constraints and their influence 
on the animal communication processes. Introducing indexes or 
indices as signals that use pre-existing physical restrictions or relations 
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to convey meaning is a major innovation that Maynard Smith made 
later for evolutionary biology. Additionally, in semiotics the role of 
physical relations or Peircean secondness as a “brute action” for se-
miotic processes has not received enough attention. From the writings 
of Thomas A. Sebeok we know that semiosis is the most characteristic 
trait of life that is common to all life forms (Sebeok 2001:10–12). 
Jesper Hoffmeyer has added to this the principle of growth of semiotic 
freedom (understood as the depth of meaning that an individual or 
species is capable of communicating, Hoffmeyer 2008: 186). The 
physical space that the biosemiosphere inhabits, relates to and gra-
dually overcomes, has remained, however, a quite unexplored area in 
semiotics. 
In following, I am sketching a few possibilities for how physical 
processes can relate to and be involved in semiosis. First, semiosis may 
incorporate Peirce’s secondness in order to foresee and avoid this 
brute force. For instance, a bighorn sheep that uses its senses for 
searching for safe passage over a mountain cliff employs semiosis to 
avoid the effect of a physical impact. Cause-effect relations and 
physical necessities, as for instance the need for food, form a major 
class of objects of semiosis in the animate world. Additionally, regu-
larities of the living world constantly become bases for the formation 
of new signs and semiotic structures. According to the maxim by 
Jesper Hoffmeyer: “Whenever a new habit appears, it tends to become 
a sign for somebody” (Emmeche, Kull, Stjernfelt 2002: 20). The speci-
fics of this process, and the patterns and limitations in it, are, however, 
not very well scrutinised in semiotics. Karel Kleisner’s concept of 
semiotic cooption, defined as a situation when the character that was 
shaped serving a particular role or having a specific meaning within 
the Umwelt of an organism is coopted by another organism gaining 
thus a new meaning within its Umwelt, hints at a possible direction 
(Kleisner 2010). In such a process of sign formation, similarity and 
categorisation can turn out to be vital mechanisms.  
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Second, signs may often be motivated and non-arbitrary because of 
the existent physical properties or regularities of the world. Here we 
can think of biological universalities — described on the linguistic 
level as ontological metaphors by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson 
(1980: 25–32) — for instance up, growth, full, whole, fresh, symmetry 
having generally more positive connotations than down, decay, partial, 
rotten, asymmetry. These relations are built on the general tendencies 
of organisms participating in natural processes and the behaviour of 
organic matter. As such, they are quite general but not absolute in 
nature, as for the meat fly, rotten flesh is just fine. Another example of 
this kind would derive from the studies of Heini Hediger on spatial 
relations. Mutually liberating and lasting physical proximity in 
humans or animals stands for non-aggressiveness and psychological 
closeness. Grooming behaviour in primates as a sign of attachment 
has been built on the physical premise that for aggression, close 
distance is needed. 
Third, in some cases there is a specific interrelatedness of semiotic 
and non-semiotic processes, where things that do not participate in 
the semiosis become objects in the subsequent semioses. An example 
of such type can be found in camouflage and mimesis. Differently 
from most communicative relations of animals, in camouflage and 
mimesis the specific appearances that do not participate in semiosis 
prevail for the subsequent generations, whereas those which do 
participate in semiosis fail. Despite that, the appearances that emerge 
in such a process of exclusion have a semiotic nature by developing an 
iconic sign-relation with the object of their imitation (cf. Maran 2007). 
Another example of a similar kind can be found in the intensity of 
signals transmitted in communication. The intensity itself, for 
example, the loudness of the call, may not have any specific meaning 
for the receiver (although in many cases it is an icon), and in this sense 
it does not participate in semiosis. At the same time the intensity of 
the signal is the relevant prerequisite for making semiosis possible and 
thus it also influences the process of semiotic selection. 
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A possibility for the dialogue between semiotics and evolutionary 
biology could especially be found in the relationship between the phy-
sical necessities and effects of semiotic selection, between the moti-
vatedness of signals and unpredictability of semiosis and the influence 
of all this on the evolution and development of animal communication 
and sign systems. From semiotics this would require acknowledging 
the role of physical processes and limitations in semiosis, and from 
evolutionary biology the introduction of a subjective interpretative 
perspective. The latter is actually nothing new — in 1993 Tim Guilford 
and Marian Stamp Dawkins argued that evolutionary biology would 
benefit from psychological perspective (Guilford, Dawkins 1993). 
There is unfortunately little such emphasis in the writings of Maynard 
Smith and his approach to semiotics also remains on the level of naïve 
interpretation which focuses mainly on adapting terminology. It is 
also an unfortunate turn of events of scientific development that 
Maynard Smith approached semiotics through the works of Umberto 
Eco, who is one of most anthropocentric and culturocentric figures 
among the classical authors of semiotics. Given the significant diffe-
rences between the foundations of both paradigms as well as con-
temporary developments, it is not very likely that the door slightly 
opened by John Maynard Smith would be used by many researchers in 
coming years. 1 
 
 
                                                 
1  This research was supported by the European Union through the European 
Regional Development Fund (Centre of Excellence CECT) and by Estonian 
Science Foundation Grant No. 7790. 
John Maynard Smith's typology of animal signals  493 
References 
 
Ariew, André; Lewontin, R. C. 2004. The confusions of fitness. The British Journal 
for the Philosophy of Science 55(2): 347–363. 
CP = Peirce, Charles S. 1994. The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce. 
[Electronic version (Folio Bound Views); vols. 1–6, Hartshorne, Charles, 
Weiss, Paul (eds.), 1931–1935; vols. 7–8, Burks, Arthur W. (ed.) 1958.] 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. [In-text references are to CP, followed 
by volume and paragraph numbers] 
Deacon, Terrence W. 1997. The Symbolic Species. The Co-Evolution of Language 
and the Brain. New York, London: W. W. Norton. 
Eco, Umberto 1976. A Theory of Semiotics. Bloomington, London: Indiana Uni-
versity Press. 
Emmeche, Claus; Kull, Kalevi; Stjernfelt, Frederik 2002. Reading Hoffmeyer, 
Rethinking Biology. (Tartu Semiotics Library 3.) Tartu: Tartu University Press. 
EP = Peirce, Charles Sanders 1992. The Essential Peirce. Selected Philosophical 
Writings. Vol. 1 (1867–1893). [Houser, Nathan; Kloesel, Christian (eds.)] 
Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. 
Godfrey-Smith, Peter 2000. Information, arbitrariness, and selection: comments 
on Maynard Smith. Philosophy of Science 67(2): 202–207. 
Guilford, Tim; Dawkins, Marian Stamp 1993. Receiver psychology and the design 
of animal signals. Trends in Neurosciences 16(11): 430–436. 
Hoffmeyer, Jesper 2008. Biosemiotics. An Examination into the Signs of Life and 
the Life of Signs. [Transl. Hoffmeyer, Jesper; Favareau, Donald.] Scranton: 
Scranton University Press.  
Kleisner, Karel 2010. Perceive, co-opt, modify, and live! Towards an under-
standing of organism as a centre of experience. In: Markoš, Anton (ed.), Bio-
hermeneutics. Biosemiotics 5. Springer: Berlin. Forthcoming.  
Komárek, Stanislav 2003. Mimicry, Aposematism and Related Phenomena. 
Mimetism in Nature and the History of its Study. Muenchen: Lincom Europa. 
Krebs, John R.; Davies, Nicholas B. 1993. An Introduction to Behavioural Ecology. 
[3rd ed.] Oxford: Blackwell Scientific.  
— 1997. The evolution of behavioural ecology. In: Krebs, John R.; Davies, 
Nicholas B. (eds.), Behavioural Ecology: An Evolutionary Approach. [4th ed.] 
Oxford: Blackwell Science, 3–12. 
Krebs, John R.; Dawkins, Richard 1984. Animal signals: mind-reading and mani-
pulation. In: Krebs, John R.; Davies, Nicholas B. (eds.), Behavioural Ecology: 
An Evolutionary Approach. [2nd ed.] Sunderland: Sinauer, 380–402. 
Timo Maran  494
Kull, Kalevi 1999. Biosemiotics in the twentieth century: a view from biology. 
Semiotica 127(1/4): 385–414. 
—  2004. Uexküll and the post-modern evolutionism. Sign Systems Studies 
32(1/2): 99–114. 
Kull, Kalevi; Emmeche, Claus; Favareau, Donald 2008. Biosemiotic Questions. 
Biosemiotics 1: 41–55. 
Lakoff, George; Johnson Mark 1980. Metaphors We Live By. Chicago, London: 
The University of Chicago Press. 
Maran, Timo 2005. Mimikri kui kommunikatsioonisemiootiline fenomen. [Mimicry 
as a communication semiotic phenomenon]. Dissertationes Semioticae Unive-
rsitatis Tartuensis 7. Tartu: Tartu University Press. 
—  2007. Semiotic interpretations of biological mimicry. Semiotica 167(1/4), 223–
248. 
Marler, Peter 1961. The logical analysis of animal communication. Journal of 
Theoretical Biology 1: 295–317. 
— 1978. Affective and symbolic meaning: Some zoosemiotic speculations. In: 
Sebeok, Thomas (ed.), Sight, Sound and Sense. Bloomington: Indiana Uni-
versity Press, 113–123. 
Maynard Smith, John 1982. Do animals convey information about their 
intentions? Journal of Theoretical Biology 97(1): 1–5. 
—  1995. Genes, memes, & minds [Daniel C. Dennett. Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: 
Evolution and the Meanings of Life]. The New York Review of Books 42(19): 
46–48. 
— 1999. The idea of information in biology. The Quarterly Review of Biology 
74(4): 395–400. 
—  2000. The concept of information in biology. Philosophy of Science 67(2): 177–
194. 
Maynard Smith, John; Harper, David 1995. Animal signals: models and termi-
nology. Journal of Theoretical Biology 177(3), 305–311. 
—  2003. Animal Signals. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Maynard Smith, John; Szathmáry, Erös 2000. The Origins of Life: From the Birth of 
Life to the Origin of Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Mills, Susan K.; Beatty, John H. 1979. The propensity interpretation of fitness. 
Philosophy of Science 46(2): 263–286. 
Morris, Charles 1971a. Foundations of the theory of signs. In: Morris, Charles. 
Writings on the General Theory of Signs. The Hague: Mouton, 17–71. 
—  1971b. Signs, language, and behavior. In: Morris, Charles. Writings on the 
General Theory of Signs. The Hague: Mouton, 73–397. 
John Maynard Smith's typology of animal signals  495 
Nöth, Winfried 2005. Semiotics for biologists. Journal of Biosemiotics 1:195–211. 
Queiroz João, Ribeiro, Sidarta 2002. The biological substrate of icons, indexes, and 
symbols in animal communication: a neurosemiotic analysis of Vervet 
monkey alarm-calls. In: Shapiro, M., (ed.) The Peirce Seminar Papers 5 — The 
State of the Art. Oxford: Berghahn Books, 69–78. 
Sebeok, Thomas A. 1972. Perspectives in Zoosemiotics. (= Janua Linguarum. Series 
Minor 122). The Hague: Mouton de Gruyter. 
—  1990. Essays in Zoosemiotics (= Monograph Series of the TSC 5). Toronto: 
Toronto Semiotic Circle; Victoria College in the University of Toronto. 
—  1991. The semiotic self. Sign Is Just a Sign. Bloomington, Indianapolis: Indiana 
University Press, 36–40. 
—  1994. Signs: An Introduction to Semiotics. Toronto and Buffalo: University of 
Toronto Press. 
—  2001. Global semiotics. In: Sebeok, Thomas A. Global Semiotics. Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1–16. 
Smith, W. John 1986. An “informational” perspective on manipulation. In: 
Mitchell, Robert W.; Thompson, Nicholas S. (eds.), Deception. Perspectives on 
Human and Nonhuman Deceit. New York: State University of New York Press, 
71–86. 
SS = Peirce, Charles Sanders 1977. Semiotic and Significs: The Correspondence 
Between Charles S. Peirce and Victoria Lady Welby. [Hardwick, Charles S.; 
Cook, J. (eds.)] Bloomington: Indiana University Press.  
Stegmann, Ulrich E. 2005. John Maynard Smith’s notion of animal signals. 
Philosophy and Biology 20(5): 1011–1025.  
Szathmáry, Eörs 2006. Birds as aeroplanes: Remembering John Maynard Smith. 
Biological Theory 1(1): 84–86. 
Weber, Thomas P. 2000. Biological objects, units of selection and character 
decomposition. Trends in Ecology & Evolution 15(8): 304–305. 
Williams, Nigel 2007. Signs of the times. Current Biology 17(17): R735–R737. 
Zahavi, Amotz; Zahavi, Avishag 1997. The Handicap Principle: A Missing Piece of 
Darwin’s Puzzle. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
 
Timo Maran  496
Типология сигналов животных Джона Мейнарда Смита  
с семиотической точки зрения 
 
Взгляды на коммуникацию животных в семиотике и эволюционной 
биологии в большинстве своем довольно разные. На этом фоне 
труды ведущего эволюционного биолога Джона Мейнарда Смита, 
интересующегося семиотикой, являются интересным исключением и 
объектом изучения. Данная статья сосредоточивается на использова-
нии и приспособлении семиотической терминологии в трудах Сми-
та, привлекая общие теоретические установки как эволюционной 
биологии так и семиотики. Развивая типологию сигналов животных, 
Смит использует понятия икона, индекса и символа для обозначения 
разных классов сигнала. Он пользуется индексом для обозначения 
типа сигнала, в котором отношение между качествами и значением 
сигнала ограничено в силу физических качеств сигнала. Такой под-
ход указывает на проблему мотивированности знака, которая имеет 
длинную историю в семиотике. В последней части статьи анали-
зируется использование в трудах Мейнарда Смита понятий формы и 
значения. Оказывается, что в эволюционной биологии сигнал 
является неопределенным понятием, который может обозначать 
целую группу явлений: начиная от конкретного физиологического 
статуса животного до теоретических конструкций. Кроме того, 
становится ясным, что, используя концепцию сигнала в реальности, 
зачастую указывают на активность принимающего и процесс интер-
претации, что характеризуют скорее знаковой процесс в целом. 
Положительное влияние работ Смита на семиотику может состоять 
в обращении внимания на роль физических потребностей в ком-
муникации животных. Физические ограничения и отношения, до сих 
пор недостаточно изученные и понятые в семиотике, играют извест-
ную роль и в семиотических процессах. 
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John Maynard Smithi loomasignaalide tüpoloogia  
semiootilisest vaatenurgast 
 
Vaated loomade kommunikatsioonile on semiootikas ja evolutsioonibio-
loogias olnud enamasti küllalt erinevad. Sellel foonil on semiootikast 
huvitunud juhtiva evolutsioonibioloogi John Maynard Smithi kirjutised 
põnevaks erandiks ja uurimisobjektiks. Käesolev artikkel keskendub se-
miootilise terminoloogia kasutamisele ja kohandamisele Maynard Smithi 
töödes, kaasates üldiseid teoreetilisi lähtekohti nii semiootikast kui evolut-
sioonibioloogiast. Arendades loomasignaalide tüpoloogiat, võtab May-
nard Smith kasutusele ikooni, indeksi ja sümboli mõisted tähistamaks eri 
signaaliklasse. Ta kasutab indeksi mõistet tähistamaks signaalitüüpi, 
milles suhe signaali omaduste ja tähenduse vahel on piiratud signaali füü-
siliste omaduste tõttu. Selline lähenemine osutab märkide motiveerituse 
probleemile, millel on semiootikas pikk ajalugu. Artikli viimases osas ana-
lüüsitakse signaali vormi ja tähenduse mõistete kasutust ja sisu Maynard 
Smithi kirjutistes. Selgub, et evolutsioonibioloogias on signaal ebamää-
rane mõiste, mis võib tähistada hulka nähtusi looma konkreetsest füsio-
loogilisest staatusest kuni teoreetiliste konstruktsioonideni. Samuti saab 
selgeks, et signaali kontseptsiooni tegelikult kasutades viidatakse sageli 
vastuvõtja aktiivsusele ja interpretatsioonile, mis iseloomustavad pigem 
märgiprotsessi. Maynard Smithi tööde positiivne mõju semiootikale võiks 
seisneda tähelepanu pööramises füüsiliste vajaduste rollile loomade 
kommunikatsioonis. Füüsilised piirangud ja suhted näivad omavad olulist 
rolli ka semiootilistes protsessides, olgugi et neid pole semiootikas alati 
piisavalt uuritud või mõistetud. 
 
 
